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1. INTRODUCTION 
One	   of	   the	   most	   salient	   and	   original	   features	   of	  
Wittgenstein’s	   later	   philosophy	   is	   the	   appeal	   it	   makes	   to	  
ordinary	  language:	  “What	  we	  do	  is	  to	  bring	  words	  back	  from	  
their	   metaphysical	   to	   their	   everyday	   use”	   (PI	   §116).	   This	  
appeal	  situates	  our	  language	  and	  concepts	  within	  the	  broader	  
forms	   of	   life	   in	   which	   we	   use	   them	   so	   as	   to	   dispel	   certain	  
idealizations	   that	   creep	   into	   our	   thinking.	   For	   instance,	  
Wittgenstein	  links	  our	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “understanding”	  to	  the	  
broader	   patterns	   of	   behaviour	   into	   which	   it	   fits—the	  
circumstances	   in	   which	   we	   say	   we	   or	   someone	   else	   has	  
understood,	  when	  we	  withhold	  ascribing	  understanding,	  what	  
sorts	  of	  sufficiently	  bizarre	  outcomes	  could	  upset	  our	  normal	  
use	  of	  the	  word,	  and	  so	  on—to	  clarify	  the	  criteria	  for	  using	  the	  
word.	  One	  result	  of	  his	   investigation	   is	   that	   “understanding”	  
cannot	   denote	   a	   distinct	   inner	   state	   or	   process	   because	   the	  
criteria	   for	   using	   the	  word	   connect	   essentially	  with	   outward	  
behaviour	   (see	   PI	   §§138–55).	   Wittgenstein	   insists	   that	   his	  
investigation	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  explanations	  or	  discoveries,	  but	  
simply	  on	  describing	  what	  we	  already	  know:	  “All	  explanation	  
must	  disappear,	  and	  description	  alone	  must	  take	  its	  place”	  (PI	  
§109).1	  Wittgenstein	  aims	   to	  dissolve	  philosophical	  confusion	  
not	  by	  telling	  us	  anything	  new	  but	  by	  drawing	  our	  attention	  
to	   features	   of	   our	   ordinary	   use	   of	   words	   that	   we	   have	  
overlooked	  or	   forgotten.	  This	   appeal	   to	  ordinary	   language	   is	  
innovative	   precisely	   in	   its	   recognition	   that	   such	   reminders	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Cf.	  also	  PI	  §§89–90	  and	  126.	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can	  be	  philosophically	  fruitful	  at	  all,	  and	  that	  what	  is	  open	  to	  
view	  may	   still	   elude	   us.	  We	  miss	   certain	   simple	   but	   crucial	  
facts	  precisely	  because	  they	  are	  so	  obvious.2	  
Avrum	   Stroll	   (2002,	   104)	   claims	   that	   Wittgenstein	   is	  
the	   first	  philosopher	  to	  recognize	  that	  reminders	  of	  ordinary	  
and	   obvious	   facts	   can	   have	   powerful	   and	   less-­‐than-­‐obvious	  
philosophical	   consequences.	   However,	   Stroll	   seems	   to	   have	  
forgotten	   about	   Heidegger.	   Heidegger’s	   phenomenology,	  
much	   like	  Wittgenstein’s	   appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language,	   finds	  
insight	   in	   drawing	   our	   attention	   to	   things	   we	   have	   passed	  
over	  because	  they	  are	  already	  so	  familiar.	  For	  Heidegger,	  the	  
entities	   that	   are	   most	   familiar	   to	   us	   are	   the	   ones	   whose	  
significance	   is	   the	   most	   difficult	   to	   assess:	   “That	   which	   is	  
ontically	  closest	  and	  well	  known,	  is	  ontologically	  the	  farthest	  
and	   not	   known	   at	   all;	   and	   its	   ontological	   signification	   is	  
constantly	  overlooked”	  (BT	  43/69).	  Stroll’s	  oversight	  is	  at	  least	  
somewhat	  understandable.	  Not	  only	  does	  Heidegger	  write	   in	  
a	   tradition	   that	   is	   remote	   from	   and	   opaque	   to	  many	   of	   the	  
scholars	   interested	   in	   Wittgenstein,	   but	   both	   his	   style	   and	  
ambitions	   seem	   impossibly	   remote	   from	   anything	  we	  might	  
recognize	   as	   “ordinary	   language.”	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
similarities	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Wittgenstein	  are	  striking,	  
the	   more	   so	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   contact	   or	   shared	   influence	  
between	  them.	  	  
Within	   Heidegger	   scholarship,	   comparisons	   with	  
Wittgenstein	  have	  found	  a	  certain	  currency	  in	  developing	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Gordon	  Baker	  (2004b,	  263)	  offers	  a	  “Provisional	  Typology	  of	  Remarks	  in	  
the	  Philosophical	   Investigations,”	  which	  identifies	  three	  different	  kinds	  of	  
remarks:	   (1)	   remarks	   on	   grammar	   (e.g.	   PI	   §199:	   “It	   is	   not	   possible	   that	  
there	   should	   have	   been	   only	   one	   occasion	   on	   which	   only	   one	   person	  
followed	  a	  rule”),	   (2)	  extremely	  general	   facts	  of	  nature	  (e.g.	  PI	  §142:	   “The	  
procedure	  of	  putting	  a	  lump	  of	  cheese	  on	  a	  balance	  and	  fixing	  the	  price	  by	  
the	   turn	   of	   the	   scale	  would	   lose	   its	   point	   if	   it	   frequently	   happened	   that	  
such	   lumps	   suddenly	   grew	   or	   shrank	   with	   no	   obvious	   cause”),	   and	   (3)	  
pictures	  (e.g.	  PI	  §194:	  “The	  possibility	  of	  a	  movement	  is	  supposed,	  rather,	  
to	  be	   like	  a	   shadow	  of	   the	  movement	   itself”).	  When	   I	   talk	  about	   “simple	  
but	  crucial	  facts,”	  I	  mean	  facts	  in	  the	  broader	  sense	  in	  which	  (1)	  and	  (3)	  as	  
well	   as	   (2)	   constitute	   observations	   about	   fundamental	   but	   unnoticed-­‐
because-­‐obvious	  features	  of	  our	  existence.	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normative	   and	   socially	   constituted	   aspects	   of	   Heidegger’s	  
analytic	  of	  Dasein.3	  My	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  extend	  that	  comparison	  
in	   the	  opposite	  direction.	  Rather	   than	  ask	  how	  Wittgenstein	  
informs	   our	   reading	   of	   Heidegger,	   I	   will	   investigate	   how	  
Heidegger	  informs	  our	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein.	  In	  particular,	  
I	   will	   claim	   that	   extending	   the	   parallels	   between	   Heidegger	  
and	   Wittgenstein	   allows	   us	   to	   unearth	   something	   like	   a	  
Heideggerian	  appeal	   to	  authenticity	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	  appeal	  
to	  ordinary	  language.	  
Such	  an	  exercise	  amounts	  to	  more	  than	  adding	  to	  the	  
list	   of	   similarities	   other	   authors	   have	   found	   between	  
Wittgenstein	   and	   Heidegger.	   Rather,	   it	   constitutes	   a	   step	  
toward	  clarifying	  what	  might	  be	  described	  as	  the	  moral	  fervor	  
of	  Wittgenstein’s	  work.	  On	  one	  hand,	  Wittgenstein	  has	   little	  
to	   say	   about	   ethics	   and	   is	   dismissive	   of	   saying	   anything	   of	  
much	  use	   about	   it.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   his	  writing	   carries	   a	  
rare	   moral	   intensity,	   which	   only	   occasionally	   comes	   to	   the	  
surface. 4 	  Drawing	   out	   the	   quasi-­‐ethical	   import	   of	  
Wittgenstein’s	   appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language	   through	   its	  
connection	   to	   Heideggerian	   authenticity	   clarifies	   the	   nature	  
of	  this	  moral	  intensity.	  
I	   begin	   by	   sketching	   Heidegger’s	   conception	   of	   the	  
shared	  world	   of	   Being-­‐with	   and	  das	  Man	   in	  Being	   and	   Time	  
(section	  2)	  before	  exploring	  how	  Wittgenstein	  helps	  us	   flesh	  
out	  that	  shared	  world	  (section	  3).	  Heidegger	  finds	  a	  too-­‐ready	  
absorption	   in	   this	   shared	   world	   to	   be	   a	   signal	   feature	   of	  
inauthenticity,	  raising	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Wittgenstein’s	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  ordinary	  betrays	  a	  flight	  into	  inauthenticity.	  
But	   far	   from	   insisting	   on	   the	   unshakeability	   of	   our	   ordinary	  
practices,	   I	   claim,	   Wittgenstein	   emphasizes	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Heidegger	  scholars	  who	  make	  reference	  to	  Wittgenstein	  include	  Hubert	  
Dreyfus	  (1991),	  Charles	  Guignon	  (1983),	  John	  Haugeland	  (1982),	  and	  Taylor	  
Carman	   (2003).	   An	   early	   proponent	   of	   the	   Wittgenstein-­‐Heidegger	  
comparison	  is	  Karl-­‐Otto	  Apel,	  a	  number	  of	  whose	  essays	  on	  the	  topic	  are	  
collected	  in	  English	  in	  Apel	  (1980).	  




ungroundedness	   (section	   4).	   This	   emphasis	   on	  
ungroundedness	   allows	   me	   to	   trace	   the	   moments	   in	  
Wittgenstein’s	   appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language	   that	   parallel	  
Heidegger’s	   description	   of	   anxiety,	   the	   uncannines	   that	   it	  
discloses,	   and	   the	   authenticity	   of	   owning	   up	   to	   this	  
uncanniness	  (section	  5).	  
	  
2. DASEIN AS BEING-WITH 
Of	  all	  Heidegger’s	  coinages,	  the	  best	  known—Dasein—
is	  not	  in	  fact	  a	  neologism.	  It	   is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  
go	   untranslated	   in	   discussions	   of	   Heidegger.	   Literally	  
rendered	  as	  “being	  there,”	   it	   is	  most	  commonly	  translated	   in	  
non-­‐Heideggerian	   contexts	   as	   “existence,”	   though	   here	   it	  
differs	  from	  Existenz	  in	  referring	  not	  so	  much	  to	  the	  bare	  fact	  
of	   being,	   but	   rather	   to	   the	   mode	   or	   quality	   in	   which	  
something	  or	  someone	  exists.	  I	  might	  assert	  the	  Existenz	  of	  a	  
paternal	   aunt,	   but	   then	   talk	   about	   the	  misery	   of	   her	  Dasein	  
and	  how	  I	  might	  alleviate	  it.	  	  
Heidegger	  picks	  up	  on	  this	  qualitative	  aspect	  of	  Dasein	  
in	  yoking	  it	  to	  his	  phenomenological	  project,	  which	  places	  the	  
lived	   quality	   of	   existence	   before	   abstract	   theorizing.	  
Heidegger	  first	  introduces	  the	  term,	  saying	  that	  he	  will	  use	  it	  
to	  describe	  “[t]his	  being	  which	  each	  of	  us	  is	  himself	  and	  which	  
includes	  inquiring	  as	  one	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  its	  Being”	  (BT	  
7/27).	  Dasein	  is	  different	  from	  other	  entities	  in	  that	  its	  being	  
can	  be	  an	  issue	  for	  it:	  rocks	  simply	  are,	  whereas	  Dasein	  always	  
takes	  a	  stance	  on	  who	  it	  is,	  what	  it	  has	  been,	  and	  what	  it	  will	  
become—even	   if	   it	   never	   formulates	   this	   stance	   explicitly—
and	   it	  can	   inquire	  about	   its	  own	  being.	  Dasein	   is	  not	   simply	  
just	   another	   entity	   to	   be	   encountered	   in	   the	   world,	   but	   is	  
rather	  the	  being	  to	  whom	  all	  these	  entities	  are	  intelligible	  and	  
matter.	   Heidegger	   calls	   Dasein	   a	   “clearing”	   (BT	   133/171)	  
because	  entities	  become	  intelligible	  as	  entities	  only	  within	  the	  
space	  opened	  up	  by	  Dasein.	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Heidegger’s	   starting	   point,	  which	   constitutes	   the	   first	  
division	   of	   Being	   and	   Time,	   is	   the	   analytic	   of	   Dasein	   in	   its	  
average	  everydayness:	  he	  seeks	  to	  grasp	  Dasein’s	  ordinary	  self-­‐
understanding. 5 	  The	   self-­‐understanding	   that	   interests	  
Heidegger	   is	   not	   the	   thematic	   self-­‐understanding	   of	   human	  
existence	   that	   we	   find	   in	   the	   work	   of	   philosophers,	   but	   the	  
pre-­‐theoretical	   understanding	  with	  which	  Dasein	   engages	   in	  
the	  world	  proximally	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part.6	  Before	  giving	  any	  
explicit	  answer	  as	   to	  how	  it	  understands	   itself	  and	   its	  world,	  
Dasein	   already	   gives	   an	   implicit	   answer	   in	   its	   practical	  
engagement	  with	   the	  world.	  Heidegger	   characterizes	  Dasein	  
as	   Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world:	   he	   begins,	   that	   is,	   by	   considering	  
Dasein	   as	   embedded	   in	   and	   engaged	   with	   its	   world	   rather	  
than	   considering	   it	   from	   a	   position	   of	   detached	  
contemplation.	   “Sciences	   are	  ways	   of	   Being	   in	  which	  Dasein	  
comports	   itself	   towards	   entities	   which	   it	   need	   not	   be	   itself.	  
But	   to	   Dasein,	   Being	   in	   a	   world	   is	   something	   that	   belongs	  
essentially”	   (BT	   13/32).	   Our	   everyday	   comportment	   already	  
presupposes	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  world	  we	  engage	  in,	  and	  
Heidegger	   investigates	   this	   basic	   intelligibility	   by	   examining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Dreyfus	   (1991,	   28)	   cites	   three	   reasons	   that	   Heidegger	   gives	   for	   taking	  
Dasein	  as	  a	  starting	  point—that	  Dasein	  relates	  to	  its	  being	  as	  a	  question,	  
that	  Dasein	  understands	  itself	   in	  terms	  of	   its	  average	  understanding,	  and	  
that	  Dasein’s	   understanding	   of	   its	   being	   implies	   an	   understanding	   of	   all	  
modes	   of	   being—while	   remarking	   that	   none	   of	   these	   reasons	   is	   fully	  
convincing.	   I	   am	  not	   sure	   they	   are	  meant	   to	   be,	   or	   could	   be.	  Heidegger	  
conceives	  of	  his	  project	  as	  a	  hermeneutic	  circle:	  no	  matter	  where	  we	  start,	  
we	  must	   provisionally	   take	   some	   things	   for	   granted,	   but	   can	   then	   circle	  
back	  to	  question	  those	  assumptions	  and	  reconfigure	  our	  project	  in	  light	  of	  
this	   further	   questioning.	   If	   there	   were	   rock-­‐solid	   reasons	   for	   taking	   just	  
this	  starting	  point,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  reason	  to	  circle	  back	  and	  reinterpret	  
it.	  And	   indeed,	  Division	   II	   of	  Being	   and	   Time	   can	  be	   read	   as	   just	   such	   a	  
reinterpretation.	  
6	  This	  frequent	  Heideggerism	  is	  Macquarrie	  and	  Robinson’s	  translation	  of	  
zunächst	   und	   zumeinst.	   Stambaugh	   has	   it	   as	   “initially	   and	   for	   the	  most	  
part.”	  Zunächst	   can	  mean	  either	   “initially”	  or	   “proximally,”	  depending	  on	  
context.	  As	  it	  is	  used	  in	  Being	  and	  Time,	  both	  translations	  are	  appropriate:	  
Heidegger	  emphasizes	  that	  we	  are	  ensconced	  in	  the	  world	  in	  an	  engaged	  
manner	   before	   we	   can	   contemplate	   it	   in	   a	   disengaged	   manner,	   and	   we	  
encounter	   the	  world	   in	   this	  way	  because	   the	  equipment	  and	  others	   in	   it	  
are	  ontically	  closest	  to	  us	  (das	  ontisch	  Nächste)	  (BT	  43/69).	  
	  
6	  
Dasein	   in	   its	   “average	   everydayness”	   (BT	   43/69).	   In	   other	  
words,	  like	  Wittgenstein,	  Heidegger	  begins	  with	  the	  ordinary.	  
To	   understand	   how	   this	   everydayness	   can	   be	  
“average”—and	   to	   consider	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   non-­‐average	  
everydayness—we	  must	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  a	  crucial	  feature	  of	  
Heidegger’s	  analytic	  of	  Dasein:	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  not	  Dasein	  
alone,	   but	   exist	   essentially	   in	   this	   world	   with	   others.	   We	  
encounter	   other	   people	   proximally	   and	   for	   the	  most	   part	   as	  
Dasein,	   and	   not	   as	   the	   sealed-­‐off	   enigmas	   that	   the	  
problematic	   of	   other	   minds	   skepticism	   presents	   to	   us.	   The	  
engaged	  world	  of	  everydayness	  finds	  us	  acting	  with	  and	  upon	  
tools	   that	  were	   equally	  made	   for,	   and	   could	   equally	  be	  used	  
by,	   other	   people	   like	   ourselves.	   And,	  more	   importantly,	   our	  
own	  sense	  of	  who	  and	  what	  we	  are	  is	  shaped	  by	  our	  engaging	  
with	  others	  whom	  we	  deem	  to	  be	  our	  fellows.7	  
Heidegger	   finds	   the	   traditional	   conception	   of	   the	   self	  
as	   an	   isolated	   consciousness	   inadequate	   because	   Dasein	  
comes	   into	   its	   Dasein-­‐hood	   as	   Being-­‐with-­‐one-­‐another:	   the	  
“who”	   of	   everyday	  Dasein	   is	   not	   the	   isolated	   individual,	   but	  
the	   individual	   constituted	   by	   social	   norms.	   Being-­‐with	   is	   a	  
necessary	  and	  structural	  feature	  of	  Dasein—an	  existentiale	  in	  
Heidegger’s	   jargon—because	   it	   is	   a	   condition	   for	   the	  
possibility	  Dasein’s	   articulated,	   intelligible	  world.	   Each	  of	   us	  
makes	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  in	  our	  own	  way,	  but	  the	  very	  notion	  
of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
concepts	  with	  which	  we	  make	  sense	  of	   the	  world,	  are	   things	  
we	  articulate	  together.	  
If	   Being-­‐with	   is	   a	   constitutive	   feature	   of	   Dasein’s	  
existence,	   then	   Dasein’s	   existence	   is	   largely	   constituted	   by	  
features	   that	   are	   not	   uniquely	   its	   own.	  One	   feature	   of	   tools’	  
readiness-­‐to-­‐hand	  is	  that	  they	  are	  ready-­‐to-­‐hand	  for	  others	  as	  
well.	  A	  shoe	  is	  only	  a	  shoe	  if	  anyone	  with	  the	  same	  sized	  foot	  
can	  wear	  it.	  My	  shoes	  are	  available	  to	  me	  as	  shoes	  only	  insofar	  
as	   they	   are	   available	   as	   shoes	   to	   others	   as	   well.	   This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




promiscuous	  availability	  is	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  a	  shoe	  a	  shoe:	  
it	   is	  available	   to	  many	  people	   indiscriminately	  because	   there	  
is	  a	  way	  that	  one	  wears	  shoes	  that	  applies	  across	  the	  board.	  As	  
Being-­‐with,	   Dasein	   is	   constituted	   by	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   norms	  
that	  dictate	  what	  one	  does,	  which	  Heidegger	  calls	  das	  Man.8	  
Das	  Man	   does	   not	   simply	   articulate	   the	  norms	   according	   to	  
which	  one	  wears	  shoes,	  but	  renders	  shoes	  intelligible	  as	  shoes	  
in	  the	  first	  place:	  without	  these	  norms,	  shoes	  would	  not	  show	  
up	  to	  us	  as	  shoes	  but	  as	  unintelligible	  assemblages	  of	  leather,	  
canvas,	   and	   rubber.	   Das	   Man	   is	   not	   an	   individual,	   nor	   a	  
group,	   but	   it	   “Articulates	   the	   referential	   context	   of	  
significance”	  (BT	  129/167).	  	  By	  highlighting	  the	  existential	  role	  
of	   Being-­‐with	   and	   das	   Man,	   Heidegger	   emphasizes	   that	   the	  
intelligibility	   of	  Dasein’s	  world	   involves	   sharing	   and	   shaping	  
this	   intelligibility	   in	   concert	   with	   others.	   This	   claim	   is	  
stronger	  than	  simply	  saying	  that	  I	  am	  inevitably	  a	  creature	  of	  
my	  times.	   I	  am	  not	  simply	  of	  my	   times,	  but	   in	  an	   important	  
sense,	   I	   am	   my	   times:	   the	   social	   norms	   of	   my	   milieu	   are	   a	  
constitutive	  feature	  of	  who	  I	  am,	  even	  if	  I	  react	  against	  them.	  
We	  might	  say	  that	  Heidegger	  has	  an	  externalist	  conception	  of	  
the	  self.9	  
	  
3. WITTGENSTEIN’S ATTUNEMENT AND 
DAS MAN 
Hubert	  Dreyfus	  and	  others	  have	  found	  in	  Wittgenstein	  
a	  valuable	  resource	  for	  fleshing	  out	  the	  nature	  of	  das	  Man,	  a	  
concept	   about	   which	   Heidegger	   makes	   unclear	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Both	   English	   translations	   of	   Being	   and	   Time	   render	   this	   term	   as	   “the	  
‘They,’”	  which	  is	  an	  unsatisfactory	  translation	  of	  a	  term	  for	  which	  there	  is	  
no	  good	  English	  equivalent.	  Man	   is	   the	  German	   impersonal	   third	  person	  
singular,	  the	  same	  as	  “one”	  in	  English,	  but	  translating	  das	  Man	  literally	  as	  
“the	   one,”	   as	   Dreyfus	   and	   Carman	   do,	   carries	   confusingly	   Messianic	  
connotations.	  I	  will	  leave	  das	  Man	  untranslated	  in	  this	  paper,	  but	  will	  aim	  
to	  bring	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  Heidegger’s	  usage	  as	  often	  as	  possible	  by	  
using	  verbs	  with	  either	  the	  impersonal	  third	  person	  singular	  or	  the	  passive	  
voice:	  das	  Man	  speaks	  to	  what	  “one	  does”	  or	  what	  “is	  done.”	  
9	  Carman	  (2003,	  137)	  describes	  Heidegger	  as	  a	  “social	  externalist.”	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sometimes	   conflicting	   remarks.	   Just	   as	   Heidegger	   finds	   the	  
shared	  nature	  of	  intelligibility	  a	  crucial	  and	  overlooked	  aspect	  
of	   our	   everyday	   engagement	   with	   the	   world,	  Wittgenstein’s	  
appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language	   draws	   on	   the	   overlooked	  
significance	  of	  our	  sharing	  our	  language	  and	  forms	  of	  life	  with	  
others.	   In	   drawing	   out	   the	   shared	   practices	   of	   our	   common	  
world,	  Heidegger	   focuses	  primarily	  on	   the	  readiness-­‐to-­‐hand	  
of	   tools,	   but	   much	   of	   what	   he	   says	   about	   tools	   applies	   to	  
language	  as	  well.10	  First,	  language	  operates	  as	  part	  of	  a	  holistic	  
network	  in	  which	  words	  take	  on	  significance	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
they	  relate	  to	  and	  play	  off	  other	  words,	  and	  the	  various	  roles	  
that	   they	   serve	   in	   human	   practices.	   Second,	   we	   usually	   use	  
language	   unreflectively	   and	   transparently,	   thinking	   about	  
what	  we	  want	  to	  say	  and	  not	  about	  the	  (upon	  reflection,	  quite	  
mysterious)	   fact	   that	   these	   sounds	   or	   symbols	   manage	   to	  
express	  anything	  at	  all.	  Third,	  the	  workings	  of	  language	  come	  
to	   our	   attention	   only	   when	   we	   are	   not	   operating	   smoothly	  
within	  language:	  we	  are	  far	  more	  conscious	  of	  the	  grammar	  of	  
a	   language	  we	  speak	  poorly,	   for	   instance,	  because	  expressing	  
ourselves	   in	   that	   language	   requires	   deliberation	   that	   draws	  
our	  attention	  from	  what	  we	  want	  to	  say	  to	  the	  language	  itself.	  
And	  last,	  we	  relate	  to	  language	  differently	  when	  we	  step	  back	  
from	  it	  to	  examine	  it	  rather	  than	  use	  it	  transparently	  as	  a	  tool.	  
Communication	  essentially	  involves	  agreement	  in	  how	  
we	  use	  words.	  For	  Wittgenstein,	  however,	  the	  agreement	  goes	  
far	  deeper	  than	  simply	  the	  definitions	  of	  words.	  “It	  is	  not	  only	  
agreement	   in	   definitions,	   but	   also	   (odd	   as	   it	   may	   sound)	  
agreement	  in	  judgements	  that	  is	  required	  for	  communication	  
by	  means	  of	  language,”	  he	  writes	  (PI	  §242).	  We	  are	  only	  able	  
to	   communicate	   because	   we	   already	   agree	   on	   a	   vast	   raft	   of	  
matters	   that	   underwrite	   that	   communication.	   The	  
“agreement”	  Wittgenstein	  speaks	  of	  here	  is	  Übereinstimmung,	  
in	  contrast	  with	  Einverständnis:	  not	  agreement	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  In	  Being	  and	  Time,	  Heidegger	  treats	   language	  as	  ready-­‐to-­‐hand	  (see	  BT	  
161/204),	   and	   Wittgenstein	   also	   draws	   a	   number	   of	   analogies	   between	  
language	  and	  tools	  (see	  PI	  §§11,	  14,	  15,	  17,	  23,	  41,	  42,	  360).	  Stephen	  Mulhall	  
(1994,	   144–48)	  defends	  and	  explores	   the	  comparison	  of	   language	   to	   tools	  
as	  a	  similarity	  between	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Heidegger.	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a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  but	  agreement	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  pre-­‐
reflective	  accord.	  We	  do	  not	  sit	  down	  over	  a	  negotiating	  table	  
and	  choose	  what	  judgments	  we	  will	  reach	  agreement	  on,	  but	  
rather,	   we	   are	   able	   to	   sit	   down	   at	   a	   negotiating	   table	   at	   all	  
because	  we	  already	  find	  ourselves	  in	  sufficient	  agreement	  that	  
we	   are	   able	   to	  make	   sense	   to	   one	   another.	   In	  On	   Certainty,	  
Wittgenstein	   discusses	   propositions	   like	   “The	   earth	   has	  
existed	   for	   a	   long	   time,”	   which	   have	   the	   form	   of	   empirical	  
propositions,	  but	  play	  a	  role	  more	  akin	  to	  logical	  propositions:	  
they	  are	  not	  themselves	  subject	  to	  doubt,	  but	  are	  the	  basis	  of	  
agreement	   upon	   which	   other	   matters	   can	   be	   doubted,	  
discussed,	  investigated,	  and	  so	  on.	  “We	  know,	  with	  the	  same	  
certainty	   with	   which	   we	   believe	   any	   mathematical	  
proposition,	   how	   the	   letters	   A	   and	   B	   are	   pronounced,	   what	  
the	  colour	  of	  human	  blood	  is	  called,	  that	  other	  human	  beings	  
have	   blood	   and	   call	   it	   ‘blood’”	   (OC	   §340).	   Wittgenstein	  
famously	   likens	   such	   propositions	   to	   hinges,	   writing:	   “If	   I	  
want	  the	  door	  to	  turn,	  the	  hinges	  must	  stay	  put”	  (OC	  §343).	  	  
Wittgenstein	   recognizes	   that	   this	   emphasis	   on	  
agreement	  can	  be	  mistaken	  for	  a	  dogmatic	  refusal	  to	  consider	  
certain	  questions:	  “‘So	  you	  are	  saying	  that	  human	  agreement	  
decides	  what	  is	  true	  and	  what	  is	  false?’—What	  is	  true	  or	  false	  
is	   what	   human	   beings	   say;	   and	   it	   is	   in	   their	   language	   that	  
human	  beings	   agree.	  This	   is	   agreement	  not	   in	   opinions,	   but	  
rather	   in	   form	   of	   life”	   (PI	   §241).	   Agreeing	   in	   forms	   of	   life	  
means	  sharing	  at	  least	  enough	  common	  ground	  that	  our	  lives	  
are	   intelligible	   to	   one	   another,	   such	   that	   communication,	  
understanding,	  and	  learning	  are	  so	  much	  as	  possible	  between	  
us.	  That	  we	  can	  exchange	  opinions	  at	  all,	  whether	  to	  agree	  or	  
disagree,	  means	  we	  already	  share	  enough	  in	  common	  that	  we	  
recognize	  each	  other’s	  opinions	  as	  opinions,	  and	  share	  a	  sense	  
of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  have	  an	  opinion,	  to	  form	  one,	  to	  shift	  one,	  
and	  so	  on.	  	  
Stanley	   Cavell	   calls	   this	   kind	   of	   agreement	  
“attunement”:11	  what	  I	  say	  not	  only	  reaches	  you,	  but	  resonates	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  See	   Cavell	   1979,	   32.	   The	   word	   “attunement”	   is	   also	   used	   to	   translate	  
Heidegger’s	   Befindlichkeit.	   Despite	   some	   similarities,	   the	   two	   uses	   of	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in	   you.	   In	   an	   oft-­‐cited	   passage,	   Cavell	   elaborates	   on	   this	  
attunement	  as	  	  
a	  matter	  of	  our	   sharing	   routes	  of	   interest	  and	   feeling,	  
modes	   of	   response,	   senses	   of	   humour	   and	   of	  
significance	  and	  of	  fulfilment,	  of	  what	  is	  outrageous,	  of	  
what	   is	   similar	   to	   what	   else,	   what	   a	   rebuke,	   what	  
forgiveness,	  of	  when	  an	  utterance	  is	  an	  assertion,	  when	  
an	   appeal,	   when	   an	   explanation—all	   the	   whirl	   of	  
organism	   Wittgenstein	   calls	   “forms	   of	   life.”	   (Cavell	  
1976,	  52)	  
This	  Wittgensteinian	  conception	  of	  attunement	  helps	  to	  flesh	  
out	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   shared	   intelligibility	   of	   Heidegger’s	  
Being-­‐with.	   Wittgenstein	   provides	   a	   detailed	   exploration	   of	  
Heidegger’s	   insight	  that	  sharing	  a	  world	  with	  others	  involves	  
not	   just	   sharing	   a	   common	   language	   and	   tools,	   but	  
attunement	   on	   a	   deeper	   level	   of	   overall	   orientation	   and	  
comportment.	  We	  share	   language	  and	   tools	  because	  we	  also	  
share	  a	   sense	  of	  what	   is	  worth	   saying,	  what	   sorts	  of	  projects	  
are	  worth	  pursuing,	  and	  how	  one	  goes	  about	  pursuing	  them.	  	  
Wittgenstein	  articulates	  the	  conformity	  of	  our	  general	  
comportment,	   but	   Heidegger	   finds	   in	   das	   Man	   something	  
more	   insidious	   than	   attunement. 12 	  Heidegger	   notes	   our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“attunement”	  are	  not	   the	  same,	  and	  the	  discussion	  of	  attunement	   in	   this	  
paper	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   cover	   Befindlichkeit.	   Cavell’s	   Wittgensteinian	  
conception	   of	   attunement	   is	   a	   relation	   between	   two	   or	   more	   people	  
whereas	   Heidegger’s	   attunement	   is	   a	   relation	   between	   Dasein	   and	   its	  
world.	  
12	  As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   Heidegger	   disavows	   making	   any	   value	   judgments	  
here	  or	  elsewhere	  about	  what	  he	  calls	  “deficient”	  forms	  of	  Being.	  I	  find	  this	  
supposed	  neutrality	  very	  difficult	  to	  square	  with	  the	  language	  that	  he	  uses.	  
As	   if	   “inauthentic”	   were	   itself	   not	   a	   term	   laden	   with	   negative	   value	  
judgment,	   he	   also	   refers	   to	   inauthentic	  Dasein	   as	   “deficient,”	   “lost,”	   and	  
“fallen,”	   among	   other	   things,	   in	   language	   that	   ranges	   in	   its	   associations	  
from	   psychoanalytic	   notions	   of	   repression	   and	   self-­‐denial	   to	   theological	  
notions	  of	  sin.	  The	  initial	  discussion	  of	  das	  Man	  in	  §27	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  
uses	  particularly	  strong	  language.	  Heidegger	  refers	  to	  the	  “averageness”	  of	  
das	  Man,	   saying	   it	   “keeps	  watch	  over	  everything	  exceptional	   that	   thrusts	  
itself	   to	   the	   fore.	   Every	   kind	   of	   priority	   gets	   noiselessly	   suppressed.	  
Overnight,	   everything	   that	   is	   primordial	   gets	   glossed	   over	   as	   something	  
that	  has	   long	  been	  well	  known.	  Everything	  gained	  by	  a	  struggle	  becomes	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tendency	  to	  conform	  with	  what	  one	  does,	  not	  because	  one	  has	  
decided	  to	  do	  things	  this	  way,	  but	  simply	  because	  this	  is	  how	  
things	  are	  done.	  The	  passive	  voice	  is	  revealing	  here:	  we	  accord	  
ourselves	   with	   das	   Man	   passively,	   rather	   than	   actively	  
choosing	   our	   own	   course.	   In	   our	   average	   everydayness,	  
Heidegger	   suggests,	   we	   accord	   ourselves	   with	   das	   Man	  
unthinkingly,	   allowing	   our	   actions	   and	   opinions	   to	   be	  
dictated	   to	   us	   by	   what	   one	   does	   or	   thinks,	   stifling	   our	   own	  
agency	   in	   the	   matter.	   This	   accord	   with	   das	   Man	   enables	   a	  
great	   cover-­‐up	   whereby	   we	   present	   our	   forms	   of	   life	   to	  
ourselves	   as	   binding	   and	   necessary.	   In	   according	   ourselves	  
with	  what	  one	  does,	  we	  do	  not	  simply	  choose	  not	  to	  find	  our	  
own	  way	   of	   doing	   things,	   but	   we	   avoid	   acknowledging	   that	  
there	  is	  even	  a	  choice	  there	  to	  be	  made.	  This	  cover-­‐up	  is	  the	  
keystone	   of	   what	   Heidegger	   characterizes	   as	   inauthentic	  
existence.13	  
Dreyfus	   suggests	   that	   Heidegger’s	   discussion	   of	   das	  
Man	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  between	  conformity	  and	  conformism	  
(see	  Dreyfus	  1991,	  154).	  Talking	  about	  the	  “dictatorship”	  of	  das	  
Man,	   Heidegger	   describes	   the	   conformism	   it	   induces:	   “We	  
take	   pleasure	   and	   enjoy	   ourselves	   as	   one	   takes	   pleasure;	   we	  
read,	   see,	  and	   judge	  about	   literature	  and	  art	  as	  one	   sees	  and	  
judges;	   likewise	  we	   shrink	  back	   from	   the	   ‘great	  mass’	   as	  one	  
shrinks	  back;	  we	  find	  ‘shocking’	  what	  one	  finds	  shocking”	  (BT	  
126–27/164;	  translation	  modified).	  The	  sorts	  of	  judgments	  that	  
involve	  conforming	  to	  the	  popular	  views	  on	  literature	  and	  art	  
are	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  sorts	  of	  judgments	  on	  whose	  agreement	  
Wittgenstein	   takes	   us	   to	   conform.	   The	   latter	   kinds	   of	  
agreement	  are	  what	  make	  discourse	  possible	  at	  all;	  the	  former	  
are	  the	  sorts	  of	  matters	  over	  which	  we	  can	  debate,	  agree,	  and	  
disagree	  because	  of	  the	  fundamental	  agreements	  of	  the	  latter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
just	  something	  to	  be	  manipulated.	  Every	  secret	  loses	  its	  force.	  This	  care	  of	  
averageness	  reveals	  in	  turn	  an	  essential	  tendency	  of	  Dasein	  which	  we	  will	  
call	   the	   ‘levelling	   down’	   of	   all	   possibilities	   of	   being”	   (BT	   127/165).	   If	  
Heidegger	   truly	   seeks	   to	   present	   the	   notion	   of	   das	   Man	   free	   from	   any	  
condemnatory	  language,	  he	  does	  a	  spectacularly	  bad	  job	  of	  it.	  
13	  This	  paragraph	  appears	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  form	  in	  Egan	  2012.	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kind.	   To	   use	   Wittgensteinian	   language,	   we	   might	   wonder	  
whether	   Heidegger	   has	   confused	   the	   agreement	   of	  
Einverständnis	  with	  the	  agreement	  of	  Übereinstimmung.	  	  
How	  best	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  Heidegger	  on	  das	  Man	  is	  a	  
fraught	   issue,	   and	   one	   not	   helped	   by	   inconsistencies	   in	  
Heidegger’s	   text,	   and	   I	   will	   not	   pursue	   this	   issue	   here. 14	  
Instead,	  I	  want	  to	  turn	  the	  spotlight	  on	  Wittgenstein	  and	  ask	  
whether	   Heidegger	   notices	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   our	  
attunement	  that	  Wittgenstein	  misses.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  das	  
Man,	  Heidegger	  identifies	  in	  our	  conformity	  to	  public	  norms	  
an	   existential	   tendency	   towards	   conformism.	   We	   accord	  
ourselves	  unthinkingly	  with	  public	  norms,	  and	  although	  this	  
tendency	   might	   be	   a	   lifesaver	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   driving	  
conventions,	   it	   shades	   over	   into	   the	   sort	   of	   groupthink	   that	  
suppresses	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   authentic	   existence.	   In	  
emphasizing	   our	   attunement	   without	   remarking	   on	   the	  
coercive	   nature	   of	   this	   attunement,	   a	   Heideggerian	   might	  
suggest,	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  of	  
authenticity.	   Wittgenstein’s	   appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language,	   it	  
may	  seem,	  amounts	  to	  an	  appeal	  to	  inauthentic	  absorption	  in	  
das	   Man.	   Indeed,	   Wittgensteinian	   comparisons	   with	  
Heidegger	   tend	   to	   focus	   on	   Division	   I	   of	   Being	   and	   Time,	  
where	   Heidegger	   analyzes	   Dasein	   only	   in	   its	   average	  
everydayness.	  Only	  in	  Division	  II	  does	  Heidegger	  fully	  explore	  
the	   possibility	   of	   authentic	   existence,	   and	   comparisons	  with	  
Wittgenstein	  seem	  to	  run	  dry	  at	  this	  point.	  
Answering	   this	   challenge	   requires	   that	  we	   extend	   the	  
comparison	  between	  Wittgenstein	   and	  Heidegger	   to	   include	  
Heidegger’s	   account	   of	   authenticity.	   Doing	   so	   uncovers	   an	  
important	   aspect	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   later	   philosophy	   that	  
might	   go	   unnoticed	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   this	   challenge.	  
Wittgenstein	   not	   only	   emphasizes	   our	   attunement;	   he	   also	  
emphasizes	   the	   ungroundedness	   of	   this	   attunement.	   I	   will	  
develop	   this	   point	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   and	   connect	   it	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  I	  consider	  das	  Man	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Egan	  2012.	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Heidegger’s	   conception	   of	   authenticity	   in	   the	   one	   that	  
follows.	  
	  
4. THE UNGROUNDEDNESS OF 
ATTUNEMENT 
The	   importance	   of	   shared	   practices	   and	   forms	   of	   life	  
features	   prominently	   in	   the	   secondary	   literature	   on	  
Wittgenstein,	   but	   the	   importance	   of	   there	   being	   nothing	   to	  
guarantee	  these	  shared	  practices	  and	  forms	  of	  life	  receives	  less	  
attention.	  For	   the	  most	  part,	   commentators	  on	  Wittgenstein	  
take	  our	  attunement	  as	  a	  given,	  and	  explore	  the	  consequences	  
of	  this	  given	  being	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  
communication,	  or	  as	  constitutive	  of	  a	  community.	  The	  most	  
notable	  exception	  to	  this	  rule	  is	  Stanley	  Cavell,	  whose	  reading	  
of	  Wittgenstein	  informs	  much	  of	  what	  follows.	  
Wittgenstein	   encourages	   us	   to	   examine	   language	   in	  
the	   context	   of	   the	   broader	   life	   of	   which	   it	   is	   a	   part:	   “[T]o	  
imagine	  a	  language	  means	  to	  imagine	  a	  form	  of	  life”	  (PI	  §19).	  
Wittgenstein	   often	   uses	   the	   metaphor	   of	   a	   mechanism	   to	  
show	   how	   our	   words	   and	   concepts	   are	   interconnected:15	  we	  
understand	   a	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   whole	   by	   considering	   how	   it	  
connects	   to	  other	  parts,	   and	  what	   these	  parts	   accomplish	   in	  
moving	   together.	   Grasping	   the	   use	   of	   a	   word	   involves	  
understanding	  the	  forms	  of	   life	   in	  which	  it	   finds	  application.	  
This	   point	   may	   be	   clearer	   in	   the	   case	   of	   “judgment”	   or	  
“understanding”	   than	   in	   the	   case	   of	   “cat”	   or	   “tree,”	   but	   it	  
applies	  generally.	  Examples	  involving	  chairs	  recur	  throughout	  
the	   Investigations, 16 	  with	   Wittgenstein	   showing	   how	   this	  
mundane	   concept	   relates	   to	   various	   other	   concepts—like	  
sameness,	  simple/composite,	  belief,	  and	  so	  on—such	  that	   its	  
use	  is	  embedded	  in	  our	  broader	  life	  with	  words.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  E.g.	  PI	   §§6,	   12,	   193–94,	   270–71,	   559.	  However,	  we	   have	   to	   be	   careful	   in	  
reading	  Wittgenstein’s	  use	  of	  the	  machine	  metaphor,	  as	  he	  also	  frequently	  
uses	  it	  to	  exemplify	  a	  kind	  of	  thinking	  he	  wishes	  to	  criticize.	  
16	  See	  PI	  §§1,	  35,	  47,	  60,	  80,	  253,	  356,	  361,	  368,	  486,	  575.	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If	  understanding	  a	  word	  also	  means	  understanding	  the	  
forms	  of	  life	  in	  which	  it	  finds	  application,	  learning	  language	  is	  
also	   a	   process	   of	   acculturation,	   where	   we	   are	   inducted	   into	  
the	  forms	  of	  life	  that	  involve	  language.	  Wittgenstein	  shows	  a	  
deep	   interest	   in	  what	  Cavell	   calls	   “the	   scene	   of	   instruction,”	  
where	   an	   act	   of	   teaching	   or	   learning	   takes	   place. 17 	  The	  
Investigations	   open	   with	   St.	   Augustine’s	   account	   of	   how	   he	  
learned	  language,	  which	  treats	  language	  learning	  as	  primarily	  
an	   activity	   of	   attaching	   names	   to	   things.	  Wittgenstein	   finds	  
this	   account	   inadequate	   because	   it	   assumes	   that	   language	  
learning	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  finding	  the	  right	  words	  to	  give	  
voice	   to	   a	   thinking	   that	   is	   already	   in	   place	   (PI	   §32).	  
Augustine’s	   scenario	   imagines	   the	   pre-­‐linguistic	   child	   as	  
already	  sharing	  its	  elders’	  forms	  of	  life,	  so	  that	  all	  it	  must	  learn	  
are	  the	  names	  attached	  to	  various	  things	  and	  practices,	  all	  the	  
while	  presupposing	  a	   ready	   familiarity	  with	   these	   things	  and	  
practices.	  By	  contrast,	  Wittgenstein	  emphasizes	  that	  we	  learn	  
language	  together	  with	  the	  forms	  of	  life	  of	  which	  language	  is	  a	  
part:	   in	   learning	   language,	   children	   do	   not	   simply	   learn	   to	  
attach	   labels	   to	   things,	   but	   learn	   the	   things	   along	   with	   the	  
labels.	   Cavell	   elaborates	   on	   this	   point	   in	   discussing	  
Wittgenstein’s	  vision	  of	  language:	  
In	   “learning	   language”	   you	   learn	  not	  merely	  what	   the	  
names	   of	   things	   are,	   but	   what	   a	   name	   is;	   not	  merely	  
what	   the	   form	   of	   expression	   is	   for	   expressing	   a	  wish,	  
but	   what	   expressing	   a	   wish	   is;	   not	   merely	   what	   the	  
word	   for	   “father”	   is,	   but	   what	   a	   father	   is;	   not	  merely	  
what	   the	   word	   for	   “love”	   is,	   but	   what	   love	   is.	   In	  
learning	   language,	   you	   do	   not	   merely	   learn	   the	  
pronunciation	   of	   sounds,	   and	   their	   grammatical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See	  Cavell	  1991.	  Besides	  the	  opening	  sections	  of	  the	  Investigations,	  which	  
consider	  Augustine’s	   child	   and	   the	   tribe	  of	  builders,	   see	   also	  PI	   §§27,	   31,	  
32,	  35,	  49,	  53,	  54,	  77,	  85,	  86,	  143,	  144,	  145,	  156,	  157,	  159,	  162,	  179,	  185,	  189,	  197,	  
198,	  206,	  207,	  208,	  223,	  224,	  232,	  233,	  237,	  244,	  249,	  250,	  257,	  282,	  308,	  320,	  
328,	  340,	  361,	  362,	  375,	  376,	  378,	  384,	  385,	  386,	  441,	  495,	  535,	  590,	  630,	  636,	  
and	   693.	   Cf.	   also	   Cavell	   1989,	   75:	   “In	   the	   culture	   depicted	   in	   the	  
Investigations	   we	   are	   all	   teachers	   and	   all	   students—talkers,	   hearers,	  
overhearers,	   hearsayers,	   believers,	   explainers;	   we	   learn	   and	   teach	  
incessantly,	  indiscriminately;	  we	  are	  all	  elders	  and	  all	  justices.”	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orders,	   but	   the	   “forms	   of	   life”	   which	   make	   those	  
sounds	   the	   words	   they	   are,	   do	   what	   they	   do—e.g.,	  
name,	  call,	  point,	  express	  a	  wish	  or	  affection,	  indicate	  a	  
choice	  or	  an	  aversion,	  etc.	  (Cavell	  1979,	  177–78)	  
In	  Wittgenstein’s	   view,	   learning	   what	   a	   thing	   is	   called	   also	  
involves	  learning	  what	  that	  thing	  is.	  	  
Instruction	  depends	   crucially	   on	   attunement	   between	  
the	  teacher	  and	  the	  learner.	  Most	  learning	  takes	  place	  within	  
a	  framework	  that	  the	  learner	  already	  shares	  with	  the	  teacher.	  
High	   school	   mathematics,	   for	   instance,	   follows	   a	   linear	  
progression	  because	  topics	  build	  on	  one	  another	  successively.	  
Students	   need	   a	   foundation	   in	   coordinate	   geometry	   before	  
they	   learn	  trigonometry,	  and	  a	   teacher	   inducts	  students	   into	  
the	   principles	   of	   trigonometry	   by	   drawing	   on	   that	   shared	  
framework	   of	   coordinate	   geometry.	   The	   shared	   framework	  
need	   not	   be	   so	   academically	   oriented:	   to	   teach	   someone	   to	  
give	  and	  obey	  orders,	  the	  teacher	  and	  learner	  need	  to	  share	  a	  
language,	   a	   sense	   of	   what	   a	   task	   is	   and	   why	   it	   is	   worth	  
accomplishing,	  of	  teamwork,	  and	  so	  on	  (or	  we	  might	  manage	  
to	   teach	   someone	   this	   set	   of	   commands	   because	  we	   already	  
share	   a	   sense	   of	   what	   a	   command	   in	   general	   is,	   how	   it	   is	  
taught,	  obeyed,	  and	  so	  on).	  
As	   the	   example	   of	   mathematics	   illustrates,	   what	   we	  
learn	  can	  become	  the	  shared	  framework	  for	  further	  learning:	  
trigonometry	  builds	  on	  the	  framework	  supplied	  by	  coordinate	  
geometry,	  which	  in	  turn	  builds	  upon	  the	  framework	  supplied	  
by	  Euclidean	  geometry,	  algebra,	  and	  the	  Cartesian	  coordinate	  
system,	   and	   these	   frameworks	   in	   turn	   build	   upon	   more	  
elementary	  frameworks,	  and	  so	  on	  down.	  But	  how	  far	  down?	  
How,	   for	   instance,	   can	   we	   speak	   of	   learning	   the	   activity	   of	  
learning	   without	   circularity?	   Eventually	   our	   ability	   to	   learn	  
from	   or	   with	   one	   another	   reaches	   bedrock.	   Ultimately,	   our	  
ability	   to	   learn	   from	   one	   another	   is	   a	   manifestation	   of	   our	  
basic	  attunement,	  which	  is	  not	  itself	  something	  we	  can	  teach,	  
and	  without	  which	  no	  teaching	  or	  learning	  would	  take	  place.	  
The	   importance	   of	   attunement	   to	   understanding—and	   the	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fact	  that	  this	  attunement	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  anything	  deeper	  
than	   itself—is	   the	   central	   lesson	   of	   the	   parable	   of	   the	  
wayward	   pupil,	   which	   motivates	   much	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	  
discussion	  of	  rule	  following:	  	  
Then	   we	   get	   the	   pupil	   to	   continue	   one	   series	  
(say	   “+	   2”)	   beyond	   1000—and	   he	   writes	   1000,	   1004,	  
1008,	  1012.	  	  
We	  say	   to	  him,	   “Look	  what	  you’re	  doing!”—He	  
doesn’t	   understand.	  We	   say,	   “You	   should	   have	   added	  
two:	   look	   how	   you	   began	   the	   series!”—He	   answers,	  
“Yes,	  isn’t	  it	  right?	  I	  thought	  that	  was	  how	  I	  had	  to	  do	  
it.”	  ——Or	  suppose	  he	  pointed	   to	   the	  series	  and	  said,	  
“But	   I	  did	  go	  on	   in	   the	   same	  way.”—It	  would	  now	  be	  
no	  use	  to	  say,	  “But	  can’t	  you	  see.	  .	  .	  ?”—and	  go	  over	  the	  
old	  explanations	  and	  examples	  for	  him	  again.	  (PI	  §185)	  
The	  scenario	  of	  trying	  to	  teach	  the	  wayward	  pupil	  reveals	  how	  
quickly	  our	  explanations	  come	  to	  an	  end	  with	  a	  practice	  like	  
basic	   arithmetic,	   and	   hence	   reveals	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
agreement	  that	  our	  mathematical	  practices	  presuppose.	  If	  you	  
don’t	  understand	  this,	  there	  is	  no	  deeper	  level	  of	  agreement	  I	  
can	  appeal	  to	   in	  order	  to	  bring	  you	  back	  onside;	   if	  you	  don’t	  
understand	  this,	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  where	  I	  stand	  with	  you,	  I	  have	  
no	   sense	   of	  what	   you	  might	   agree	   to.	   You	   are	   an	   enigma	   to	  
me.	  
Wittgenstein’s	   later	   work	   is	   peppered	   with	   bizarre	  
parables	   like	   that	  of	   the	  wayward	  pupil,	  where	   things	   take	  a	  
turn	   for	   the	   unexpected:	   we	   encounter	   a	   disappearing	   chair	  
(PI	  §80),	  a	  growing	  and	  shrinking	  lump	  of	  cheese	  (PI	  §142),	  a	  
talking	   lion	   (PPF	   xi	   §327),	   and	   many,	   many	   more.	   Each	  
parable	   serves	   its	   own	   particular	   purpose,	   of	   course,	   but	   a	  
common	   thread	   is	   that	   each	  challenges	  our	   assumption	   that	  
the	   forms	   of	   life	   that	   we	   inhabit	   are	   in	   some	   way	   fixed	   or	  
absolute.	  Wittgenstein	  claims	  that	  his	  interest	  in	  the	  scene	  of	  
instruction	   is	   not	   based	   in	   hypothetical	   speculations	   about	  
the	   psychology	   of	   concept	   formation—he	   is	   not	   making	   an	  
anti-­‐Chomskian	   point	   against	   the	   innateness	   of	   our	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conceptual	   categories—but	   rather	   in	   revealing	   the	   logical	  
relation	  between	  our	  concepts	  and	  our	  forms	  of	  life:	  
I	  am	  not	  saying:	   if	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  facts	  of	  nature	  were	  
different,	  people	  would	  have	  different	  concepts	  (in	  the	  
sense	  of	  a	  hypothesis).	  Rather:	   if	   anyone	  believes	   that	  
certain	   concepts	   are	   absolutely	   the	   correct	   ones,	   and	  
that	   having	   different	   ones	   would	   mean	   not	   realizing	  
something	   that	   we	   realize—then	   let	   him	   imagine	  
certain	  very	  general	  facts	  of	  nature	  to	  be	  different	  from	  
what	   we	   are	   used	   to,	   and	   the	   formation	   of	   concepts	  
different	   from	   the	   usual	   ones	  will	   become	   intelligible	  
to	  him.	  (PPF	  xii	  §366)	  
By	   exploring	  worlds	  where	   the	   facts	   are	   different	   than	  what	  
they	   are,	   and	   where	   our	   common	   understanding	   fails	   us,	  
Wittgenstein	   repeatedly	   emphasizes	   the	   ungroundedness	   of	  
our	  attunement.	  
Wittgenstein	  wants	  us	  to	  recognize	  the	   importance	  of	  
attunement,	   but	   he	   also	   wants	   us	   to	   be	   struck	   by	   just	   how	  
remarkable	   it	   is	   that	   we	   are	   indeed	   mutually	   attuned.	  
Enigmas	   like	   the	   wayward	   pupil	   bring	   this	   reminder	   into	  
sharp	   relief.	   We	   could	   be	   enigmas	   to	   one	   another—we	  
sometimes	   are—and	   if	   this	   were	   the	   rule	   rather	   than	   the	  
painful	   exception,	  we	  would	  not	   share	   the	   forms	  of	   life	   that	  
we	  do.	  If	  we	  could	  never	  be	  certain	  that	  others	  add	  as	  we	  do,	  
we	   would	   not	   use	   addition	   in	   the	   ways	   that	   we	   do.	   The	  
process	  of	  acculturation	  by	  which	  we	  come	  in	  to	  language	  and	  
shared	   forms	   of	   life	   presupposes	   a	   basic	   attunement	   that	   is	  
not	   itself	   taught	  or	   learned;	   indeed,	   our	   ability	   to	   teach	   and	  
learn	   is	   one	   manifestation	   of	   this	   attunement.	   That	   for	   the	  
most	  part	  we	  are	   sufficiently	   attuned	   that	  we	  make	   sense	   to	  
others	  and	  they	  to	  us	  is	  essential	  to	  our	  being	  able	  to	  share	  a	  
language	   and	   forms	   of	   life,	   but	   nothing	   guarantees	   this	  
attunement.	   Throughout	   the	   Investigations,	   Wittgenstein	  
seeks	   to	   undermine	   precisely	   the	   mindset	   that	   assumes	   or	  
insists	   that	   our	   attunement	   is	   justified	   by	   independent	  
standards	  of	  correctness.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  very	  practice	  of	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justification	   is	   one	  manifestation	  of	   our	   attunement.	   For	  me	  
to	  be	   able	   to	   justify	   anything	   to	   you,	  we	  must	   already	   share	  
enough	  common	  ground	  that	  you	  have	  a	  similar	  sense	  of	  what	  
a	  justification	  is,	  how	  it	  works,	  and	  what	  sorts	  of	  things	  stand	  
in	  need	  of	  what	  kinds	  of	  justification.	  
Wittgenstein	  explores	  the	  regularity	  of	  our	  attunement	  
by	   considering	   how	   we	   teach,	   learn,	   and	   apply	   rules.	  
Considering	   a	   rule	   on	   analogy	  with	   a	   signpost,	   he	   asks	   how	  
the	   signpost	   tells	   us	   which	   way	   to	   go,	   considering	   the	  
possibility	   that	   we	   could	   interpret	   an	   arrow	   like	   “—>”	   as	  
pointing	  left	  (say,	  the	  part	  on	  the	  right	  is	  not	  the	  point	  of	  an	  
arrow,	   but	   the	   opening	   of	   an	   aperture	  with	   the	   line	   flowing	  
leftward	  out	  of	  it	  signifying	  the	  direction	  one	  is	  meant	  to	  go;	  
see	  PI	  §85).	  A	   second	  arrow,	  which	   tells	  us	  how	  to	   interpret	  
the	  first,	  is	  no	  help	  here,	  since	  “every	  interpretation	  hangs	  in	  
the	  air	  together	  with	  what	  it	  interprets,	  and	  cannot	  give	  it	  any	  
support”	  (PI	  §198).	  The	  point	  here	   is	  not	  that	  the	  signpost	   is	  
inescapably	   ambiguous,	   but	   that	   neither	   the	   signpost	   itself	  
nor	   further	   instruction	   or	   interpretation	   can	   irresistibly	  
dictate	   how	   we	   use	   it.	   We	   do	   indeed	   follow	   signposts	   and	  
engage	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  rule-­‐governed	  practices	  without	  a	  
second	   thought—and	   if	  we	  did	  not,	  we	  would	  not	   share	   the	  
common	   life	   that	   we	   do—but	   this	   regularity	   manifests	   an	  
attunement	  that	  is	  itself	  ungrounded.	  
	  
5. ANXIETY AND AUTHENTICITY 
At	  the	  end	  of	  section	  3,	  I	  asked	  whether	  Wittgenstein’s	  
emphasis	   on	   attunement	   constituted	   an	   inauthentic	  
absorption	  in	  das	  Man.	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  tried	  to	  show	  
that,	   far	   from	   taking	   our	   attunement	   for	   granted,	  
Wittgenstein	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  how	  remarkable	  it	  is	  that	  
we	   make	   sense	   to	   one	   another	   at	   all.	   Wittgenstein	  
acknowledges	   the	   importance	  of	   attunement,	  but	  also	  wants	  
us	   to	   see	   this	   attunement	   as	   ungrounded.	   There	   is	   nothing	  
insidious	  about	  following	  a	  rule	  in	  the	  way	  that	  everyone	  else	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follows	   that	   rule,	  but	  we	  get	  ourselves	   into	   trouble	  when	  we	  
make	   the	   further	   step	   of	   assuming	   or	   theorizing	   that	   some	  
independent	   standard	   of	   correctness	   compels	   our	   and	  
everyone	   else’s	   conformity	   to	   the	   rule.	   Conforming	   to	   what	  
one	   does,	   then,	   is	   not	   so	  much	   the	   problem,	   but	   rather	   the	  
problem	   lies	   with	   taking	   this	   conformity	   as	   grounded	   in	   a	  
source	  more	  stable	  and	  absolute	  than	  our	  mutual	  attunement.	  
Here	  Wittgenstein	   and	   Heidegger	   are	   agreed.	   For	   the	   most	  
part,	  we	  tend	  to	  accept	  both	  our	  conformity	  to	  norms	  and	  the	  
conformism	  of	   received	  opinion	  with	  an	  air	  of	  necessity	   and	  
inevitability.	   Because	   this	   is	   the	  way	   things	   are	   done,	   surely	  
they	  could	  not	  be	  done	  in	  any	  other	  way.	  Because	  just	  this	  is	  
how	  we	  live,	  we	  want	  the	  security	  of	  seeing	  our	  forms	  of	  life	  as	  
grounded	  on	  the	  most	  solid	  bedrock.	  
Of	  course,	  even	  the	  most	  solid	  bedrock	  is	  afloat	  upon	  a	  
sea	   of	   magma.	   Even	   the	   firmest	   foundations	   are	   unstable.	  
Recognizing	   this	   fact	   is,	   for	  Wittgenstein,	   a	   key	  measure	   in	  
releasing	   us	   from	   the	   feeling	   of	   compulsion	   certain	  
philosophical	   pictures	   force	   on	   us.	   For	   Heidegger,	   it	   is	   a	  
requirement	  of	  authenticity.	  In	  Division	  I	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  
Heidegger	   explores	   anxiety	   as	   a	   crucial	  mood	   that	   signals	   to	  
us	  the	  ungroundedness	  of	  our	  forms	  of	  life.	  We	  find	  a	  similar	  
mood	  of	  anxiety	  pervading	  Wittgenstein’s	  appeal	  to	  ordinary	  
language.	   Contrary	   to	   readings	   of	   Wittgenstein	   that	  
emphasize	  the	  shared	  norms	  of	  an	  established	  community,18	  I	  
have	   highlighted	   the	   ubiquity	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   work	   of	  
scenes	   of	   instruction:	   Wittgenstein	   is	   interested	   not	   in	  
established	   communities,	   but	   in	   the	   probing	   by	   which	   we	  
explore	   and	   discover	   whether	   and	   how	   we	   can	   establish	  
common	   ground	   with	   others.	   Throughout	   these	  
investigations,	  Wittgenstein	  rehearses	  the	  anxiety	  that	  things	  
might	  not	   turn	  out	   as	  we	  expect	  or	  hope.	   In	   these	  passages,	  
Wittgenstein	   enacts	   the	   anxiety	   that	   Heidegger	   describes.	  
Investigating	  the	  scene	  of	  instruction	  induces	  the	  vertiginous	  
discovery	  that	  our	   lives	   literally	  depend	  upon	  an	  attunement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  I	  am	  thinking	  primarily	  of	  Wright	  (1980)	  and	  Kripke	  (1982).	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that	   comes	  with	   no	   guarantees.19	  For	   both	  Wittgenstein	   and	  
Heidegger,	  the	  importance	  of	  attunement	  comes	  not	  just	  with	  
the	  recognition	  that	  this	  attunement	  is	  ungrounded,	  but	  also	  
with	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   anxiety	   this	   ungroundedness	  
induces.	  
Heidegger	   describes	   two	   ways	   we	   might	   respond	   to	  
this	  existential	  anxiety.	  One	  is	  the	  inauthentic	  flight	  into	  the	  
Man-­‐selbst,	   or	   one-­‐self.	   Inauthentic	   Dasein	   flees	   from	   its	  
anxiety	   by	   absorbing	   itself	   in	   its	   everyday	   activities	   without	  
reflecting	   deeply	   upon	   them:	   Dasein	   flees	   toward	   “entities	  
alongside	  which	   our	   concern,	   lost	   in	   das	   Man,	   can	   dwell	   in	  
tranquillized	   familiarity”	   (BT	   189/233–34;	   I	  have	   left	  das	  Man	  
untranslated).	   Inauthentic	   Dasein	   engages	   in	   everyday	  
practices	  while	   turning	  a	  blind	  eye	   to	   their	  ungroundedness.	  
It	  accepts	  social	  norms	  as	  fixed	  and	  absolute,	  not	  the	  result	  of	  
human	  attunement,	  but	  simply	  “the	  way	  things	  are.”	  
By	  contrast,	  authentic	  Dasein	  confronts	  this	  anxiety	  as	  
disclosing	   the	   fundamental	   uncanniness	   (Unheimlichkeit)	   of	  
Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world:	   “Uncanniness	   is	   the	  basic	  kind	  of	  Being-­‐
in-­‐the-­‐world,	   even	   though	   in	   an	   everyday	   way	   it	   has	   been	  
covered	   up”	   (BT	   277/322).	   The	   German	   Unheimlichkeit	  
suggests	  homelessness,	  which	  captures	  precisely	  the	  sense	  of	  
disorientation	   that	   comes	   with	   discovering	   the	  
ungroundedness	   of	   our	   ordinary	   practices,	   and	   contrasts	  
suggestively	  with	  the	  connotation	  of	  home	  (Wohnung)	   in	  the	  
German	   word	   for	   “ordinary,”	   gewöhnlich.	   On	   one	   hand,	   the	  
ordinariness	  of	  our	  language	  and	  forms	  of	  life	  stems	  from	  our	  
being	   at	   home	   with	   them.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   our	   shared	  
attunement	   is	   itself	   ungrounded,	   and	   reflecting	   on	   this	   fact	  
both	   undermines	   certain	   philosophical	   prejudices	   but	   also	  
leaves	   us	  with	   the	   uncanny	   feeling	   of	   not	   being	   at	   home	   in	  
our	  practices	  in	  the	  way	  we	  had	  comfortably	  assumed.	  
Wittgenstein’s	   appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language	   does	   not	  
represent	   an	   evasion	   or	   suppression	   of	   this	   uncanniness.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  McDowell	  (2000,	  43f)	  also	  discusses	  this	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  vertigo.	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Instead,	  he	  sees	  uncanniness	  inscribed	  in	  our	  inhabitation	  of	  
the	   ordinary.	   The	   ordinary	   is	   our	   home	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  
ordinary	  language	  is	  the	  language	  that	  speaks	  to	  and	  from	  the	  
particular	   situation	   we	   find	   ourselves	   in.	   The	   concepts	   of	  
ordinary	   language	   articulate	   the	   interests	   and	   needs	   of	   the	  
people	   that	  use	   them,	  and	   they	  are	  useful	   to	   the	  extent	   that	  
they	  are	  usable.	  We	  find	  it	  useful	  to	  price	  cheese	  according	  to	  
its	  weight,	  but	  this	  practice	  would	  lose	  its	  point	  if	  the	  weight	  
of	  cheese	  were	  constantly	  fluctuating.	  If	  everything	  were	  in	  a	  
continual	   flux	  of	   rapid	  growth	  and	  shrinking,	  our	  concept	  of	  
weight	  would	  lose	  its	  point,	  or	  would	  have	  radically	  different	  
applications,	  whereas	  other	  concepts	  would	  become	  useful	  to	  
us.	  Our	  concepts	  are	  not	  absolute	  precisely	  because	  they	  are	  
responsive	   to	   our	   circumstances	   in	   their	   particularity.	   The	  
appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language	   thus	   acknowledges	   the	  
impossibility	   of	   a	   godlike	   perspective	   for	   which,	   as	  
Wittgenstein	   puts	   it,	   “certain	   concepts	   are	   absolutely	   the	  
correct	   ones.”	   Wittgenstein	   does	   not	   mean	   that,	   in	   our	  
finitude,	  we	  fail	  to	  grasp	  the	  absolutely	  correct	  concepts,	  but	  
rather	  that	  it	  is	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  concepts	  to	  belong	  to	  forms	  of	  
life	   that	   are	   themselves	   not	   absolute.	   Acknowledging	   our	  
language	  and	  forms	  of	   life	  as	  ordinary	  means	  acknowledging	  
the	  uncanny	  fact	  that	  our	  being	  at	  home	  in	  them	  gives	  them	  
no	  absolute	  grounding.	  
In	   this	   reading,	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   das	   Man	  
denotes	   conformity	   or	   conformism	   becomes	   a	   bit	   of	   a	   red	  
herring.	   What	   constitutes	   lostness	   in	   the	   one-­‐self	   is	   not	   a	  
vaguely	   defined	   conformism,	   but	   rather	   the	   suppression	   of	  
the	  uncanniness	  of	  Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  Rather	  than	  confront	  
the	   uncanniness	   of	   existence,	   inauthentic	   Dasein	   takes	  
comfort	  in	  affirming	  its	  stability.	  Inauthenticity	  does	  not	  stem	  
primarily	  from	  conformism	  in	  judgment	  over	  the	  topic	  du	  jour	  
but	   from	   suppressing	   the	   ungroundedness	   of	   all	   our	  
agreement,	   whether	   in	   conformity	   or	   conformism.	   Such	   an	  
attitude	  accepts	  the	  conformity	  of	  social	  norms	  no	  more	  than	  
authentic	   Dasein,	   but	   relates	   to	   it	   differently,	   treating	   it	   as	  
fixed	   and	   necessary.	   This	   attitude	   is	   also	   liable	   to	   fall	   into	  
some	   sort	  of	   conformism.	  A	  Dasein	   that	   relates	   to	   itself	   and	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its	   world	   as	   fixed	   and	   unchanging	   has	   no	   need	   to	   develop	  
opinions	   that	   differ	   from	   received	   wisdom.	   This	   sort	   of	  
conformism	   is	   not	   so	   much	   a	   conformism	   to	   particular	  
judgments,	  but	  rather	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  sorts	  of	  arguments	  
that	   happen	   to	   be	   current	   on	   the	   topics	   that	   happen	   to	   be	  
current.	  	  
If	   I	   am	   right	   in	   tracing	   these	   parallel	   trajectories	  
through	   Division	   I	   of	   Being	   and	   Time	   and	   Wittgenstein’s	  
appeal	   to	   ordinary	   language,	   Heidegger’s	   exhortation	   to	  
authenticity	  that	  becomes	  the	  focus	  of	  Division	  II	  is	  no	  more	  a	  
repudiation	   of	   the	   everydayness	   of	   Division	   I	   than	  
Wittgenstein’s	   reminders	  of	   the	  ordinary	   are	   repudiations	  of	  
the	  ordinary.	  Indeed,	  Heidegger	  emphasizes	  that	  authenticity	  
does	   not	   transfigure	  Dasein’s	   world	   or	   its	   relation	   to	   others	  
(BT	   297–98/344),	   just	   as	   someone	   who	   is	   fully	   cognizant	   of	  
the	   uncanniness	   of	   our	   ordinary	   practices	   need	   not	   engage	  
with	   those	   practices	   any	   differently. 20 	  Stephen	   Mulhall	  
emphasizes	  that	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  inauthentic	  Dasein	  is	  
an	  analysis	  of	  Dasein	   in	   its	  average	  everydayness,	   raising	   the	  
question	   of	   whether	   there	   are	   other	   ways	   of	   inhabiting	   the	  
everyday.	  Mulhall	  answers	  that	  authentic	  Dasein	  represents	  a	  
repudiation	   of	   inauthentic	   Dasein’s	   averageness—its	  
subjecting	   of	   itself	   to	   the	   average—and	   not	   of	   its	  
everydayness:	   “Authentic	   Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   is	   not	   a	  
transcendence	  of	  or	  escape	  from	  everydayness	  but	  a	  mode	  of	  
everydayness;	  it	  is	  not	  an	  extraordinary	  mode	  of	  Being,	  but	  a	  
mode	   of	   inhabiting	   the	   ordinary”	   (Mulhall	   1994,	   151).	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Here	   we	   might	   see	   Heidegger’s	   and	   Wittgenstein’s	   shared	   influence	  
from	  Kierkegaard,	  whose	  knight	  of	  faith	  could	  appear	  to	  all	  the	  world	  as	  a	  
humble	   shopman.	   How	   exactly	   we	   should	   spell	   out	   Heidegger’s	  
conception	  of	   authenticity	   is	   obviously	   a	   topic	   of	   considerable	   debate	   in	  
the	   secondary	   literature,	   where	   we	   find	   often	   radically	   conflicting	  
interpretations.	   I	   want	   to	   remain	   as	   neutral	   as	   I	   can	   in	   this	   discussion	  
while	   acknowledging	   the	   difficulty	   of	   interpreting	   Heidegger	   on	  
authenticity.	   My	   main	   positive	   contribution	   to	   this	   debate	   lies	   in	   the	  
suggestion	  that	  the	  comparison	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	  appeal	  to	  ordinary	  
language	  and	  Heidegger’s	  appeal	  to	  authenticity	  can	  work	  both	  ways:	  this	  
paper	  mainly	  uses	   the	   latter	   to	  draw	  attention	   to	   features	  of	   the	   former,	  
but	   I	   believe	   this	   “authentic”	   reading	   of	  Wittgenstein	   could	   also	   inform	  
our	  reading	  of	  Heideggerian	  authenticity.	  
	  
23	  
contrast	   with	   average	   everydayness	   for	   Mulhall	   is	   authentic	  
everydayness.	   Authentic	   Dasein	   does	   not	   move	   beyond	   the	  
everyday,	  but	  accepts	   the	  everyday	  without	  becoming	   lost	   in	  
it.	  
The	   moral	   fervor	   we	   find	   in	   Wittgenstein,	   which	   I	  
remarked	   upon	   in	   my	   introduction,	   has	   much	   in	   common	  
with	   what	   might	   inspire	   fervor	   in	   Heidegger’s	   appeal	   to	  
authenticity.	   In	   much	   the	   same	   way	   as	   Heidegger,	  
Wittgenstein	  sees	  most	  of	  us—especially	  those	  who	  embrace	  
traditional	  methods	  of	  doing	  philosophy—as	  lost	  and	  needing	  
recovery.	   This	   recovery	   is	   not	   a	  matter	   of	   providing	   us	  with	  
new	  ideas,	  new	  truths,	  new	  theories,	  but	  of	  helping	  us	  inhabit	  
where	  we	   are	  without	   self-­‐deception.	  Wittgenstein	  describes	  
his	  appeal	  to	  ordinary	  language	  in	  terms	  of	  “bringing	  us	  back”	  
to	  the	  everyday	  use	  of	  words.	   If	  we	  are	  to	   find	  an	  analogy	   in	  
Heidegger,	   Wittgenstein’s	   calling	   us	   back	   to	   the	   ordinary	  
resembles	  nothing	  quite	  so	  much	  as	  the	  Heideggerian	  call	  of	  
conscience.	   Not	   coincidentally,	   Heidegger	   also	   characterizes	  
this	   call	   in	   terms	   of	   bringing	   back:	   in	   heeding	   the	   call	   of	  
conscience,	   “Dasein	   specifically	   brings	   itself	   back	   to	   itself	  
from	  its	  lostness	  in	  das	  Man”	  (BT	  268/312;	  I	  have	  left	  das	  Man	  
untranslated).	   Philosophy,	   for	   both	   Wittgenstein	   and	  
Heidegger,	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   moving	   forward	   to	   the	   new	  
discovery	   that	  will	  ground	  our	  practices,	  but	   rather	  a	  matter	  
of	  calling	  us	  back	  to	  the	  ungroundedness	  that	  we	  have	  always	  
already	  known	  and	  always	  already	  forgotten.21	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  In	   addition	   to	  my	   fellow	   editors,	   I’m	   particularly	   grateful	   for	   feedback	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